T he pain and disability caused by osteoporotic vertebral frac tures have long motivated the search for effective therapy. Two procedures designed to restore vertebral body height and func tion have been widely adopted: percutaneous vertebroplasty, in which cement is injected into the vertebral body to support the fractured bone; and kyphoplasty, a variant of vertebroplasty in which a balloon is inserted and inflated in a collapsed vertebral body, restoring the bone's height before the cement injection. Ini tial studies suggested that these procedures were superior to con ventional symptomatic treatment. But when later studies cast doubt on those favorable findings, health care funding agencies sought to curb their use. The story of these procedures offers a glimpse of the ways in which comparativeeffectiveness research (CER) may influence medical practice and health care expen ditures.
Early studies of these proce dures were neither randomized nor blinded, and because the symptoms of compression frac tures often abated over time, the lack of adequate controls made it impossible to know whether im provements that followed treat ment would have occurred even without surgery. Furthermore, neither procedure was riskfree; reported complications included compression fractures, cement leakage, pulmonary complica tions, paraplegia, and death. 1 In a scenario that's likely to be re peated frequently as CER gains greater acceptance and support, randomized trials eventually fol lowed the observational studies that had fostered the initial en thusiasm. 2 If the full conse quences of that research are not yet fully apparent, their potential importance is. Were the results of betterdesigned studies trans lated into practice, the reduction in U.S. health care expenditures would be considerable.
CER treats effectiveness as a balance of benefits and harms; when the risks associated with a procedure outweigh its clinical benefits, it is appropriate and ethical to limit its use. Both the clinical need and the desire to avoid wasteful expenditures were part of the rationale for subject ing these procedures to compar ative studies. Furthermore, con sensus that these procedures were promising but unproven led sev eral countries to make them available on an interimcoverage basis. These arrangements, in ef fect from 2006 through 2010, al lowed the procedures to be per formed in everyday practice while further evidence was generated.
Trials conducted during that period suggested that kyphoplasty did not improve outcomes. The studies of vertebroplasty produced varying results, but the highest quality trials cast doubt on the benefit and raised additional safety concerns. In a randomized but nonblinded trial by Kallmes et al., 3 patients who underwent vertebroplasty and controls had similar reductions in disability and pain scores, with a trend to ward a higher rate of clinically meaningful improvement in pain (30% decrease from baseline) in the vertebroplasty group that neared statistical significance (64% vs. 48%, P = 0.06). In a ran domized, blinded trial by Buch binder et al., 4 vertebroplasty did not have a statistically significant advantage over placebo in any measured outcome over 6 months, although pain diminished in both groups.
These studies illustrate the dif ficulty of inferring the effects of treatments for a condition with a variable time course, particular ly when its manifestations are strongly influenced by placebo effects. But the studies at best cast doubt on the magnitude of any benefits from these proce dures and at worst established their ineffectiveness. The find ings led U.S. and other payers to revisit their interim funding de cisions. To improve safety and quality and to respond to pres sures for fiscal responsibility and efficiency in health care, payers are deciding to limit or withdraw coverage for these procedures. In late 2010, the Blue Cross Blue Shield Association's Medical Ad visory Panel confirmed its deci sion that neither procedure met its criteria for established effec tiveness, and in Canada, the On tario Health Technology Advisory Committee ruled that vertebro plasty should not be considered the standard treatment for osteo porotic vertebral fractures. Any CER agenda strives for improved safety and quality of care. By identifying relative inef fectiveness, CER may also im prove the health care system by freeing up resources to be used for safer and more effective forms of care. Savings from limiting the use of care whose effectiveness is unproven can be substantial, whether the intervention is new or has already been disseminated. According to our analyses of data from the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project, 5 in 2008 the cost of kyphoplasty and vertebro plasty was approximately $1 bil lion. The table shows the estimat ed savings in the United States, by insurance type, under alterna tive assumptions about reduc tions in utilization. A 50% reduc tion in utilization would deliver annual savings of $450 million; an 80% reduction would save about $725 million annually. Since these figures are based on costs rather than charges or payments, they are highly conservative. And although these figures appear small relative to U.S. health care expenditures, the procedures are not among the most common. Furthermore, savings are large in relation to the $1.1 billion that Congress allocated to CER in the 2009 American Recovery and Re investment Act. When the Patient Centered Outcomes Research In stitute, created by the Affordable Care Act (ACA), is fully opera tional, its budget is expected to reach $500 million annually, or just two thirds of the potential savings each year from dimin ished use of just two apparently ineffective procedures.
The savings might be reduced if patients who don't receive one of these procedures end up being treated more aggressively with other forms of care. For example, patients who do not undergo ver tebroplasty might receive more pain medications or physical ther apy than patients who undergo the procedure. However, such off sets in savings would be substan tial only if the procedures greatly diminish symptoms for an ex tended period. Furthermore, the costsavings estimates don't take into account expenditures for the treatment of adverse effects of the procedures.
CER won't always yield defini tive conclusions about a therapy's effectiveness; individual patients might benefit despite disappoint ing results in randomized trials. But the adoption of a procedure in routine practice, if not part of a welldesigned study, probably won't reveal the characteristics of the patients likely to benefit. If observational studies are well de signed and build on clinically de tailed data, they can often eluci date information about subgroups that were not studied in a trial. But the limitations of convention al observational studies for a con dition with fluctuating symptoms and whose main manifestation is pain apply here: without double blinding and closely matched controls, it will be surpassingly difficult to distinguish the effects of the intervention from the nat ural history of the condition. Thus, without randomized trials, ineffective and costly treatments with risks and complications would continue to be adminis tered largely because the alterna tive treatments are disappoint ing. If nothing else, welldesigned studies demonstrating ineffective ness can help redirect research toward the development of alter natives.
Of course, savings will be de rived from CER only if practice changes. In the United States, it's unclear whether these studies are powerful enough to overturn cov erage decisions or cut utilization of established procedures. The status quo plays a large role in de termining the burden of proof for interventions: if a procedure has spread widely, large, welldesigned studies must show that it's clearly ineffective or harmful before pay ers and providers will abandon it; for a new procedure, the assump tion is that effectiveness has not been established, so good studies demonstrating effectiveness are required for its adoption. Increas ingly, funding agencies and poli cymakers aim to subject estab lished practices to greater scrutiny, since often interventions adopted without strong evidence are later found to be ineffective or not as effective as initially thought.
ACA features such as bundled How CER Could Pay for Itself
Without randomized trials, ineffective and costly treatments with risks and complications would continue to be administered largely because the alternative treatments are disappointing.
The New England Journal of Medicine payments, shared savings pro grams, and outcomesbased pay ments offer mechanisms for stim ulating the adoption of practices that are supported by CER and the abandonment of practices that CER calls into question. The ben efits for patients are large, as are the potential savings. Support for CER, reinforced by appropriate payment changes, is likely to rep resent a very good investment for the federal government and U.S. taxpayers.
